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PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND
FDA GUIDANCE: A NEW HOPE
Nathan Cortez*
Jacob S. Sherkow**

Assessments of a President'sfirst 100 days in office typically focus on
legislative priorities and executive orders. Less attention is paid to early
victories achieved via guidance and other informal acts of "presidential
administration." The COVID-19 pandemic has opened a window for the
Biden Administration to effectuate critical public health policies through
guidance issued by the Food and Drug Administration. This brief essay
highlights the power-andpitfalls-ofeffectuating public healthpolicy this
way, and discusses the lasting power of guidance for any new
administration.
A President's first 100 days in office is often marked by the Chief's
major executive orders and legislative priorities. Less attention is typically
devoted to a different type of policymaking-administrative guidance, an
important instrument of regulatory policy that details an agency's "thinking"
on a specific subject.1 Guidances are especially important for the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), as they constitute "the agency's primary
mode of policymaking." 2 In President Biden's first 100 days, FDA has issued
nine guidances, all final, meaning that they largely reiterated the work of the
previous administration. 3 The lack of new draft guidance belies the critical
importance of guidances to FDA's work-and as an instrument of executive
policy. In an age where the Agency is routinely placed under the vise of
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1.

E.g., Guidances, FDA (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/guidances

[https://perma.cc/H7R9-CWMS] ("Guidance documents represent FDA's current thinking on a topic.").

2.

Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 212 (2014).

3.

Search for FDA Guidance Documents, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-

guidance-documents (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S8S3-DNW5].

179

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW ONLINE

180

[Vol. 2021

political pressure, and perhaps neglect by a gridlocked Congress, 4 the
President has the authority to free FDA to pursue policy experiments via
guidance.5 We argue he should do so.
FDA is an important agency. It is the nation's steward for public health,
which it largely advances by interacting with-and enforcing its interpretation
of-highly technical legal and scientific matters. 6 Ideally, agencies like FDA
craft new policies via legislative enactments or rulemaking. But the previous
administration's management of the Agency, combined with political stalemate
in Congress, has made that difficult. 7 By contrast, guidances, according to FDA
staffers, "provide for quicker communication, [are] more flexible, [and] allow[
FDA] to communicate in a way that . . . is helpful and timely." 8 Guidance can
relieve some pressure from congressional gridlock and may be used as an
institutional marker to resist future political pressure, especially when such
pressure runs counter to scientific evidence. 9 Guidance thus can be a key tool of
"presidential administration," a president's "public assertion of ownership of
agency action" that persists long after the next administration has moved in. 10
So far, President Biden has done a good job of elevating science back to its
proper, superlative place in policy discourse, including making the Office of
Science and Technology Policy a cabinet-level office." But, at the time of this
writing, Biden has yet to nominate a new FDA Commissioner, leaving potential
gaps in the exercise of the Agency's full power.1 2 Yet Congress, especially as of
late, seems inert on matters of technical, scientific policy. 13 Guidance, then,

4.

See Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health, 2022 UNIV. ILL. L. REv.

(forthcoming

2022)

(manuscript

at

39-41), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3792217

[https://perma.cc/Q5WX-3MUV].
5. Cf Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2353 (2001) (describing
agencies' "need to incorporate in administrative decisionmaking the scientific, technical, and other kinds of
professional knowledge and experience that agency officials possess" as a form of "experimentalism and
information sharing").
6.

See, e.g., Advisory Committee Research Reports, and Announcements, FDA (Mar. 27, 2018)

https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/ucml65313.htm
[https://perma.cc/5N89-RZYZ] ("The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to assist in its mission to protect and
promote the public health, uses 50 committees and panels to obtain independent expert advice on scientific,
technical, and policy matters.").
7.

Sherkow, supra note 4, at 35-41.

8.

Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration:

Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FooD & DRUG L.J. 17, 23 (2005).
9.

See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2344 (suggesting that presidential oversight over rulemaking can relieve

"political gridlock"); Sherkow, supra note 4, at 39-41 (noting this in the context of FDA emergency use
authorizations).
10.

Kagan, supra note 5, at 2299.

11.

Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based

Policymaking, WHITE HOUSE

(Jan.

27,

2021),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-

actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-

based-policymaking/ [https://perma.cc/79HP-FN48].
12. See Michael R. Taylor, ProtectingFDA's Ability to ProtectPublicHealth, 61 FooD & DRUG L.J. 805,
808 (2006) (linking congressional oversight of FDA policy to periods of "interregnum between commissioners").
13.
(Feb.

Martha Kinsella, CongressionalScience and Technology Capacity Must Be Revitalized, JUsT SEC.

10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68404/congressional-science-and-technology-capacity-must-be-

revitalized/ [https://perma.cc/3B84-6UKH].
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seems like a good opportunity both to address emerging problems and
experiment while also putting down public and rhetorical stakes to Biden's

presidency. 14
This would be true even in some parallel universe where the country's only
major scientific policy problems were political; where a deadly pandemic was
not sweeping the nation and claiming hundreds of thousands of lives. The
pandemic and a slowly unfurling economic crisis are some of the best excuses
for FDA to be aggressive in promulgating policies through guidance. COVID19 therapeutics and vaccines are coming online, as set against a rapidly changing
technological landscape. 15 There is not necessarily time to build a robust
rulemaking record for every decision FDA may encounter. 16 And the Agency is
already endowed with flexibility and discretionary authority through its
Emergency Use Authorization program.1 7 Even for guidances that skirt the line
of the Agency's legal authority, industry, it seems, welcomes them; regulated
firms need signals about what to expect from FDA. 18 Given the speed of the
pandemic, the absence of a Senate-confirmed Commissioner, and a less
responsive Congress, FDA's most frequent customers seem to recognize that
such policies are not going to be enacted through traditional legislation or

rulemaking.19
But guidance can be useful beyond merely immediate and short-term ends.
Guidance can effectively bind future administrations, particularly if the guidance
is later codified into statute. This is not unusual; FDA policies that were first
floated in guidance documents find their way into the U.S. Statutes at Large with
some frequency. 20 Seen this way, guidances can be a vehicle for policy
experimentation, subject to further refinement through experience. 2 1 Particularly
for dynamic technologies, guidance can be a way for FDA to test potential
paradigm shifts in regulation. 22 In 2017, for example, FDA announced plans to
14.

Kagan, supra note 5, at 2299.

15.

Sherkow, supra note 4, at 21-26.

16.

See, e.g., id. at 23 ("For COVID-19, for example, waiting for the full completion of an 'average'

vaccine clinical trial would result, at current case fatality rates, in the deaths of a staggering 20.8 million people.").

17.

Id. at 28-33.

18.

Cortez, supra note 2, at 215 n.268.

19.

Cf Richard Moscicki, Lessons Learned from COVID-19: The Way We Develop New Medicines Is

Changing, CATALYST (Feb. 10, 2021), https://catalyst.phrma.org/lessons-learned-from-covid-19-the-way-wedevelop-new-medicines-is-changing [https://perma.cc/4MNE-EQXL] (noting industry participating with FDA in
crafting guidances during the pandemic).
20.

With acknowledgement of the irony, after FDA first published a guidance document declaring several

"Good Guidance Practices," including notice-and-comment type procedures, Congress later codified FDA's
approach via statute. See Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed.
Reg. 47,314 (Oct. 15, 1992); The Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance
Documents,

62 Fed.

Reg. 8961

(Feb. 27,

1997); Food

and Drug Administration Modernization

and

Accountability Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 405, 111 Stat. 2296, 2368-69 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 371(h)); see also Cortez, supra note 2, at 213.
See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, DigitalHealth and Regulatory Experimentationat the FDA, 21 YALE J. L.

&

21.

TECH. (SPECIAL
22.

ISSUE)

4 (2019).

Id. at 14-19 (explaining how experiments with digital health regulation introduced under former FDA

Commissioner Scott Gottlieb represented important departures from longstanding FDA oversight of medical
products such as drugs and traditional devices); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011).
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experiment with digital health regulation, including outsourcing review from
FDA to third parties, shifting most review from the pre-market to post-market
phase, and focusing on firm-level indicators of quality rather than product-level
indicators. 23 Each represents an important departure from traditional medical
product regulation. 24 And none were previously contemplated by statute.2 5
Of course, guidance presents its own problems. One is that initial postures
announced via guidance can become de facto rules that are never reexamined,
updated, or codified. 26 For example, the late 1980s, in response to deaths caused
by radiation machines, FDA published draft guidances for regulating medical
device software. 27 But the drafts were never finalized or codified, and FDA
withdrew them without comment 18 years later. 28 Thus, during a revolution in
computerized medicine, when software became critical to patient care, FDA
offered only tentative guidance, and then-nothing. 29 The guidance became stale
and perhaps even counterproductive. It was not until 2012 that Congress asked
FDA to recommend a risk-based framework for regulating software. 30 Failed
guidance experiments sometimes endure. 31
And sometimes guidance can be too durable-used not as a pilot or
precursor to lawmaking, but as a substitute. By the 1990s, FDA had become
notable for relying more on guidance than rulemaking to advance policy,
eventually issuing twice as many guidances as rules.3 2 Yet, despite being hailed
as more "flexible" than rulemaking, 33 guidances are actually updated less
frequently. 34 Eventually, backlash against FDA's use and abuse of guidance led
the agency to adopt its own "Good Guidance Practices," committing itself to

23. Scott Gottlieb, FosteringMedical Innovation: A PlanforDigitalHealth Devices, FDA (Jun. 15, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm [https://perma.cc/B4WA-L6YV].
24.

Cortez, supra note 21, at 14-19.

25.

Id. at 25; Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Patty Murray, & Tina Smith, U.S. Sens., to Scott Gottlieb,

Comm'r, FDA & Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, FDA (Oct. 10, 2018) 3-4,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.10.10%20Letter%20to%20FDA%20on%20regulation%20
of%20sofware%20as%20medical%20device.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD3L-FBFY].
26.

Cortez, supra note 2, at 216.

27.

Draft Policy for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104 (Sep. 25, 1987); FDA Draft

Policy for the Regulation of Computer Products (proposed Nov. 13, 1989) (on file with author); Cortez, supra

note 2, at 191-96.
28.

Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug Administration, 70 Fed.

Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
29.

Cortez, supra note 2, at 191-96.

30. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA) § 618, Pub. L. No. 112144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012).
31. Nathan Cortez, Analog Agency in a Digital World, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 438 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen
eds. 2015).
32.

See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 8, at 25-26; Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and

Informal Models of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 168 (2000); K.M. Lewis, Informal

Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 520 (2011).
33. Wu, supra note 22, at 1843-48.
34.

Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119

YALE L.J. 782, 818-19 (2010).

First 100 Days] PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND FDA GUIDANCE

183

follow notice-and-comment-like procedures akin to rulemaking.35 This episode
presaged heavy use of guidance by other federal agencies, which led to similar
"Good Guidance Practices" imposed on executive agencies by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). 36 FDA's guidance practice in this way became
not so much a stamp of executive authority but a tattoo.
Still: given the concurrent crises now facing the country, guidance presents
the Biden Administration with a convenient but powerful tool to right the
Agency. Guidance, if used as a tool of policy experimentation-particularly as a
true precursor to rulemaking or legislation-can be an important executive tool
for protecting public health. But making guidance work-and avoiding
established pitfalls-requires being sensitive to guidance's past failures,
following FDA's Good Guidance Practices, and ventilating policies before they
are considered for rulemaking or legislation-whether in an administration's
first 100 days or its last.

35.

Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314

(Oct. 15, 1992); The Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents,

62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997); 5 U.S.C. § 553.
36. Final Bulletin on Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).

